The world has changed, and the EU and the wider West need to face up to the reality that their views no longer hold sway across the South Caucasus - the countries of the region now have more “agency” and more options. That was the key message delivered by Azerbaijani President Aliyev at a policy forum in Baku on 9 April.

For him, it was naive to think that decisions taken in Europe would change anything in Azerbaijan - bureaucrats in Brussels and Strasbourg were living on their own planet. Partnership yes, friendship yes, as long as they didn’t try to impose. Trying to divide the world into those they liked and those they didn’t like was doomed to fail.

In his telling, “some in Europe” wanted to create new dividing lines in the region, were making unwarranted accusations that Azerbaijan was planning military action against Armenia, and were behaving hypocritically over Azerbaijani gas exports. European Commission President Von der Leyen came in for personal criticism for having, at the EU-Central Asia Summit, ignored what Aliyev regarded as Azerbaijan’s (and Georgia’s) crucial role in the Middle Corridor, referring only to the importance of the opening of Armenia’s borders. Meanwhile, the Biden Administration was also criticized for having reimposed defense-related sanctions on Azerbaijan once they no longer needed Azerbaijani troops and transport routes following withdrawal from Afghanistan.

There was clearly a sense of resentment in Aliyev’s remarks about a perceived shift in Western policy in favor of Armenia. But his comments, delivered in response to questions, were very much at one with the broader theme of the policy forum, entitled, “Facing The New World Order.”

Of course, the “changing world order” is currently at the top of every government’s agenda. Even before the Trump Administration’s shock therapy for international security and economics, changes to the pre-existing Western-centered multilateralism have been clear. 

Possibly this started with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which super-charged China’s position as the manufacturing workshop of the world (seen by some as equivalent to the Trojans taking the Greek wooden horse into their city).

But certainly, the global financial crash - from which China’s state capitalism emerged as an attractive model for many countries in the developing world - and Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in 2012 have marked a clear change in the world order. The rise of other powerful leaders and the strengthening of nationalism, plus Putin’s military adventurism, have caused the rules-based international order to fracture. Suddenly there are other centers of power, and true multilateralism has started to give way to multipolarity and “minilateralism,” involving smaller groups with closer interests and values. In the case of Azerbaijan, this includes the Organization of Turkic States.

For example, the West was clearly taken aback when much of the developing world did not support the condemnation of Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, and declined to impose sanctions. And - for Azerbaijan - Europe has not learned any lessons. The threats of sanctions over the 2023 military operation to retake Karabakh and over human rights issues are seen in Baku as hypocrisy, and the EU (and Biden Administration) had already been pushed out of any meaningful role in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace negotiations due to perceived bias. 

In the case of Georgia, too, the Europeans and the Biden Administration, when faced with a government’s change of direction away from the West, appeared to immediately reach for the sanctions toolbox. For Aliyev, the EU was displaying colonial attitudes: for him, this was unacceptable - Georgian issues should be resolved by the Georgian people, not by bureaucrats in Brussels. No doubt the Georgian government would agree. 

To be fair to Azerbaijan, the country has played an important role in multilateralism, having chaired the Non-Aligned Movement for several years, and having more recently hosted and chaired COP29. But at the same time, it has long kept its foreign policy options open, having to maneuver in a complicated neighborhood.

But increasingly, Baku - echoing many others - believes that relations with the West should be based on “interests,” not “values.” Aliyev was even quick to poke the EU about what he saw as a lack of common values, with divergent views among member states.

The dilemma of “interests versus values” is not a new one, and is never as clear cut as many would wish. But the new world order is throwing this into sharp relief, and the EU - by giving the impression of focusing on “values” rather than “interests” - is playing itself out of the South Caucasus. 

This is unfortunate. The South Caucasus should be tailor-made for the EU. Regional cooperation, transport links, and economic development are areas where the EU could - and should - have a leading role, and areas which hold enormous promise for the whole region. But by offering carrots only to Armenia, and wielding sticks at Georgia and Azerbaijan, the EU appears to be opting out of a regional dimension to its policy.

Interestingly, Aliyev was much more amenable towards the Trump Administration, and he felt there had been a reduction in anti-Azerbaijan rhetoric, including in U.S. media. He was confident that the new Administration would focus more on “real” U.S. national interests in the region, and he felt that early contacts at all levels were helping to craft a productive agenda. 

Time will tell to what degree the new Administration changes the U.S. approach towards the South Caucasus, but at least they have an opportunity to step back and take a fresh look. Meanwhile, the EU and Council of Europe, pushed to an extent by parliamentarians, continue to struggle to gain traction. Perhaps this is an opportunity for the new U.S. Administration to show renewed leadership in a region important in its own right, and also as a vital part of the Middle Corridor and link to Central Asian minerals.