In a surprise announcement in early April, US President Donald Trump said that the United States has been holding “direct talks” with Iran and hinted at upcoming meetings. Sure enough, on April 12 Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi met Trump’s Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oman for indirect talks to discuss a potential nuclear deal with Tehran. After the Oman meeting, the two sides agreed to continue discussions.  

This comes at a time when the Trump Administration has been applying “maximum pressure” on Iran, Washington’s active military campaign against Iran’s proxies in the Middle East, and the global financial system inching towards a meltdown after Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs. 

The defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump withdrew from during his first term in 2018, remains a key sore point in US-Iran relations. Beyond the outcomes of any negotiations, it is also important to highlight that countries of the Caspian region will have to continue to engage with an Iran that is strengthening its ties with Moscow and Beijing.

Reviving the JCPOA under Trump 2.0?

After his return to the White House, Trump quickly restored “maximum pressure” on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles while curtailing its abilities to support its proxies in the Middle East. 

Despite this, Trump said he would “like a deal done with Iran on non-nuclear" and that he “would prefer that to bombing the hell out of it.” 

Trump’s urgency to end the war in Ukraine and alienate Washington’s NATO allies has pushed Europe to reconsider the nature of its relationship with the United States. A revived Iran nuclear deal with the collaborative nature of the JCPOA might be unlikely and could undercut the authority of the IAEA. 

Given Trump’s “maximum pressure” policies, Washington could demand Iran to reverse its nuclear weapons advancements as a bilateral initiative with a pathway for further engagement. In November 2024, Elon Musk had already met with Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss ways to ease US-Iran tensions. 

A Russian quid pro quo? 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has strengthened its ties with Iran in various sectors from economic integration, arms transfers, and energy cooperation. In January this year, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty valid for the next 20 years. Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom has also been supporting Iran in the construction and operation of its Bushehr nuclear power plant. 

The increasing alignment of Russia and Iran is one of the most relevant shifts in regional dynamics since the JCPOA was first negotiated, with Russia having actively pressured Iran toward negotiating the 2015 deal.

In a phone call with President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to help broker a nuclear deal with Iran. It remains unclear what Moscow is offering for Iran to be at the table. More importantly, it is unknown whether Washington is ready to engage in genuine negotiations.

If key foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration are a non-nuclear Iran and the end the war in Ukraine, then Russia has placed itself as prime mover in both situations. A “peace deal” in Ukraine would require Russia’s approval and participation and an Iran nuclear deal would necessitate some form of guarantees to Iran’s security that Russia could provide if Tehran were to surrender its nuclear ambitions. 

Consequences for the Caspian Region

Moscow’s overtures to Washington on settling the Iranian nuclear question illustrates a more significant trend of Russia’s entrenchment in the region’s affairs. As Russia and Iran persist as the most heavily sanctioned nations in the world, Moscow may have to continue to take up the bill in funding Iranian infrastructure projects as part of developing the “North-South Corridor”. 

Tehran has already threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if the UN sanctions are “snapped back”. Beyond undermining the international non-proliferation regime, it would give further impetus for Iran to advance a nuclear weapons program. There is no doubt that a nuclear Iran – while potentially “stabilizing” relations with the United States by introducing mutual vulnerability – could embolden Tehran to pursue antagonistic behavior with its non-nuclear neighbors. 

Within the Caspian region, this could have meaningful implications, especially for neighboring Azerbaijan. Baku and Tehran have historically tense relations, with a myriad of issues such as Azerbaijan’s military ties to Israel and Iran’s mistreatment of its large Azerbaijani minority, producing points of friction. Iran has also opposed the creation of the Zangezur transit corridor through Armenia. While relations have meaningfully improved in the last year, Baku is almost certainly watching the Iranian nuclear question with interest. 

Beyond a handshake and a photo-op

While the goal of reducing nuclear proliferation risks is in the interest of global security, it is important that any deal with Iran has the substance to ensure its longevity. The signing of the JCPOA was a breakthrough not just because of the myriad restrictions and verification mechanisms it placed on Iran, but that it proved to the West that Tehran was willing to negotiate away its nuclear weapons. 

Mike Waltz, Trump’s National Security Advisor stated that the administration has not ruled out the use of force against Iran to deal with Tehran’s support of the Houthis or its potential development of nuclear weapons. While Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei restated that his country was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program, he has dismissed Trump’s calls for negotiations a “trick”. 

Following the revelation of nuclear talks with Iran, Trump also warned, “If the talks aren’t successful with Iran, I think is going to be in great danger, and I hate to say it.”

The current uncertainty of our international system spurred on by Trump’s stakes-raising transactional diplomacy has prompted countries such as South Korea and Poland to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. In such an environment where nuclear weapons are viewed as guarantors of sovereignty, what would convince Iran to step back from going nuclear? Surely a handshake and a photo-op with Trump will not be enough.