Once manageable, even cooperative at times, the relationship between Moscow and Baku has of late taken a sharp downturn that might prove irreversible. But the diplomatic unraveling goes far beyond recent arrests or canceled summits—it reflects a deeper concern in Moscow as its historic grip over the South Caucasus and Central Asia erodes.

The most immediate flashpoint is the June 27 detention of 50 Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, some for police cases dating back more than two decades. The violence and torture during the arrests in Russia was condemned by the EU Ambassador to Azerbaijan, as Baku medical examiners ruled the deaths were caused by “post-traumatic and post-hemorrhagic shock resulting from multiple injuries” sustained while in Russian custody.  The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan condemned the “unacceptable violence” used by the Russian security forces.  

The response was swift, with cultural ties severed, high-level visits canceled, and a previously planned visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk axed. Russian Emergency Minister Alexander Kurenkonv’s appearance in Baku on July 7 for a multilateral civil defense meeting stood as a procedural exception, possibly a chance to deliver high-level messages, but not a reconciliation. 

The Yekaterinburg tragedy follows months of deteriorating relations, including the December 2024 Russian downing of an Azerbaijani civilian airliner and President Putin’s apology without accepting responsibility, a massive February cyberattack Baku attributed to Moscow, President Aliyev’s conspicuous absence from Putin’s May Victory Day parade, and the release of a recording and letter ostensibly ordering the downing of the plane by a Russian officer.  Meanwhile, Baku’s raid on Russian state media outlet Sputnik Azerbaijan, along with arrests of Russian-affiliated journalists and citizens, further underscores how far bilateral trust has fallen.

Armenia spent much of 2024 distancing itself from Moscow, as Yerevan’s Foreign Minister Mirzoyan negotiated a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States, part of a geopolitical shift that embraced the West. Armenia clearly began to distance itself from Moscow and its institutions in favor of the European Union (EU), in particular.  In January 2025, Armenia’s government endorsed legislation to make a bid for (EU) membership. 

But what’s really at stake here isn’t just bilateral grievance—it’s Moscow’s vanishing leverage in the Trans-Caspian region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia where countries are building connectivity routes westward and, crucially, away from Russia.  International sanctions on Russia and Iran, along with geopolitical challenges to connectivity through Afghanistan to the Global South’s markets, have encouraged east-west engagement, technical and political coordination, and trade cooperation along a rapidly evolving Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor.”    

As part of this new-found regional collaboration, the South Caucasus is inching toward an organic peace accord that does not include Moscow as a mediator. The Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia are scheduled to meet in Dubai on July 10, and for the first time, Baku is reportedly willing to “initial” the long-stalled peace declaration. The massive payoff would see the opening of the Zangezur rail line, connecting Azerbaijan through Armenia to its Nakhichevan exclave and onward to Türkiye. This new link would double the Middle Corridor trade route’s capacity, bypass Black Sea bottlenecks, and offer Armenia an economic lifeline.  

A potential big winner on the receiving end of major energy and trade flows out of Central Asia, Ankara has given a green light to the peace deal.  Moscow has not.  For Putin, the collapse of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict would remove one of Russia’s last effective levers in the region. As Giorgi Badridze, a Georgian diplomat, recently put it, “Russia has been leveraging the conflict between these two countries over Karabakh as a tool of influence. Now, as peace nears, Russia fears it will become irrelevant.”  

Having lost Yerevan as an ally after its peacekeeper betrayal in 2020, and with increasing condescension towards Baku, Moscow has alienated both countries.  The Kremlin’s most recent moves suggest a desire to spoil this progress.  It has sent MIG fighters to patrol the Azerbaijani border, reinforced its military presence at its Gyumri base in Armenia, and warned Baku through veiled threats. There are credible fears in Baku and Yerevan of a Kremlin-orchestrated destabilization campaign to halt the peace process and retain a foothold in the region’s affairs.  Moscow appears to have reprised the U.S.-backed biolab disinformation campaign it used in Ukraine and Central Asia to target Armenians with false information that discredits Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government on the eve of the peace deal.   

This frustration isn’t limited to the Caucasus. In Central Asia, too, Moscow’s diminishing influence is being challenged.  China’s growing investment footprint, India’s trade overtures, and the West’s increasing interest in rare-earth and critical minerals have provided Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the rest of the region with options Moscow can’t control.  Russia’s status as a sanctioned, untrusted neighbor makes it more of an obstacle than a partner in most of these efforts. The Middle Corridor, which links China to Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, now represents a way out—not just logistically but geopolitically.

Against this backdrop of decline, Russia might be increasingly inclined to act as a spoiler. If Moscow cannot control the region’s integration, it may prefer to see it delayed or derailed. A single, well-timed provocation—a skirmish on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, a sudden shift in Russian posture toward Georgia, or covert sabotage of regional transport lines—could upend both the peace process and the infrastructure that promises to liberate the region from its Soviet past.  

The West would be wise to take note. The South Caucasus is not only at the edge of Europe—it’s on the cusp of a historical shift. If the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan moves forward and the Zangezur corridor opens, it will signal not just regional stability, but also the further crumbling of Moscow’s regional primacy across the entire Trans-Caspian region.  In that sense, Russia’s aggression toward Azerbaijan is not just retaliation. It’s an alarm bell.